SoftBank Group placed roughly $5.5 billion into autonomous vehicle businesses between 2018 and 2019. By April 2024, the bulk of that money had been written down, returned at a loss, or stranded inside firms that abandoned their original business models. The Japanese conglomerate's bet on self-driving technology shows what happens when a single investor tries to pick winners across robotaxis, trucking, and delivery at the peak of a hype cycle.
SoftBank exited Cruise in May 2022, selling its stake back to General Motors for $2.1 billion. That move ended the group's direct exposure to the robotaxi company 17 months before Cruise's October 2023 crisis in San Francisco, when a pedestrian dragged by one of its vehicles forced the suspension of its commercial permit. The Monet Technologies joint venture with Toyota was scaled back and eventually absorbed, failing to become the pan-Japanese mobility platform its founders envisioned. Nuro abandoned commercial autonomous delivery operations and pivoted to a business-to-business licensing model. The Vision Fund took a $3.5 billion loss on its Didi Global holding after the Chinese government's tech sector crackdown in 2021.
This is the record of SoftBank as a bruised kingmaker in mobility: the deal structures, the valuations, and the aftermath.
The Cruise Deal: $2.25 Billion With a Contingent Promise
In 2018, the SoftBank Vision Fund invested $1.35 billion in GM Cruise Holdings, the autonomous vehicle subsidiary of General Motors. The deal included a promise of an additional $1.15 billion, contingent on regulatory approval for commercial deployment of Cruise's robotaxis. That second tranche never closed. Cruise did not achieve the required regulatory milestone before SoftBank exited.
The structure gave SoftBank a significant minority stake in Cruise at a time when the firm was still years away from generating revenue. General Motors retained control of the subsidiary. SoftBank's role was that of a financial backer with a bet on a specific regulatory outcome: that Cruise would secure permission to operate a commercial robotaxi service in a major U.S. city before the option expired.
In May 2022, SoftBank sold its entire stake in Cruise back to General Motors for $2.1 billion. The sale price was below the total $2.5 billion that SoftBank had committed in principle, though the contingent $1.15 billion had never been paid. The exit returned capital to the Vision Fund but left the fund with no upside from Cruise's later operational milestones or its 2023 crisis.
Uber: Buying at a 30 Percent Discount
In early 2018, SoftBank acquired a roughly 15 percent stake in Uber through a tender offer. The purchase was structured as a secondary transaction: SoftBank bought shares from early investors and employees rather than injecting new capital into the business. The shares were priced at a valuation of $48 billion, a 30 percent discount to Uber's previous valuation of $68 billion.
The discount reflected the negotiating power SoftBank held at the time. The deal was negotiated during a period of turmoil at Uber, including the departure of founder Travis Kalanick as CEO and a series of regulatory and legal battles. SoftBank's willingness to buy at a discount gave it a large stake at a price that built in substantial downside protection.
Uber went public in May 2019 at $45 per share, giving it a market capitalization of about $75 billion. SoftBank's $48 billion entry point meant the IPO delivered a paper gain. But Uber's stock fell after listing, trading below its IPO price for much of 2019 and 2020. The position recovered in later years as Uber's ride-hailing and delivery businesses stabilized. SoftBank's exact returns on the Uber stake are not publicly broken out, but the holding did not produce the kind of catastrophic loss that marked its Didi position.
Monet Technologies: A Joint Venture That Never Scaled
In October 2018, SoftBank and Toyota announced a joint venture called Monet Technologies. The entity was designed to develop on-demand mobility services, including autonomous vehicle fleet management, for the Japanese market. The venture was intended to combine Toyota's vehicle manufacturing with SoftBank's technology and data capabilities.
Monet Technologies was positioned as a platform that would serve multiple mobility operators, not just Toyota or SoftBank. The ambition was to create a pan-Japanese mobility network that could integrate robotaxis, autonomous shuttles, and logistics services. The venture raised a combined 10 billion yen from the two parent firms in its first round.
The joint venture was significantly scaled back and eventually absorbed into Toyota's broader mobility operations. It never became the independent platform originally envisioned. The failure reflected the slower-than-expected rollout of autonomous services in Japan, where regulatory approval and public acceptance moved more cautiously than in the United States or China. Monet Technologies is a case study in how even well-funded joint ventures between giant corporations can fail to reach critical mass when the underlying technology is not ready for commercial deployment.
Didi: A $3.5 Billion Write-Down
SoftBank's position in Didi Global was one of the largest single bets the Vision Fund made in mobility. The fund participated in multiple funding rounds for the Chinese ride-hailing operator, which dominated the domestic market after winning a brutal price war with Uber. Didi went public in the United States in June 2021 at a valuation of roughly $68 billion.
In July 2021, Chinese regulators launched a sweeping crackdown on technology firms, targeting Didi specifically over data security concerns. The app was removed from Chinese app stores, and the business was barred from registering new users. Didi's stock collapsed. In December 2021, the operator announced it would delist from the New York Stock Exchange and move its listing to Hong Kong.
The Vision Fund reported a $3.5 billion loss on its Didi holding in 2021. The loss was one of the largest single write-downs in the fund's history. It demonstrated the political risk inherent in backing Chinese technology businesses, a risk that SoftBank had previously downplayed in its pitch to limited partners. The Didi loss, combined with poor performance from other Vision Fund holdings, contributed to a broader reassessment of the group's strategy.
Nuro: From Delivery Operations to Licensing
The original bet
In February 2019, the SoftBank Vision Fund led a funding round of roughly $940 million in Nuro, a company developing autonomous delivery vehicles. Nuro's vehicles were small, low-speed pods designed to carry groceries and packages rather than passengers. The firm had partnerships with Kroger and Domino's Pizza to test commercial deliveries.
Why SoftBank backed it
The round valued Nuro as a potential winner in the autonomous delivery space, a segment seen as easier to commercialize than robotaxis because the vehicles operated at lower speeds and did not carry passengers. SoftBank's bet was that Nuro could scale its operations across multiple U.S. cities and build a defensible moat through its vehicle design and partnerships.
The pivot
In 2023, Nuro laid off 30 percent of its workforce. The business abandoned its commercial autonomous delivery operations and shifted its focus to licensing its autonomous technology platform to other firms. The pivot marked a retreat from the consumer-facing vision that had attracted SoftBank's capital. Nuro's current valuation after the pivot is not established here, but the company's trajectory shows how even well-funded autonomous vehicle startups struggled to make the economics of last-mile delivery work without a path to scale.
What the Portfolio Says About SoftBank's Strategy
The pattern
SoftBank's autonomous vehicle bets share a common pattern: large, early-stage wagers on businesses that promised to commercialize self-driving technology within a few years. The deals were structured with contingent tranches, secondary purchases, and joint venture agreements that gave the investor influence without operational control. The strategy assumed that full autonomy was five years away, a timeline that proved optimistic.
The scorecard
The outcomes were mixed. SoftBank exited Cruise before its crisis, returning $2.1 billion to the Vision Fund. The Uber position performed adequately. The Didi holding produced a $3.5 billion loss. Monet Technologies was absorbed, and Nuro pivoted. None of the portfolio businesses became the dominant autonomous mobility platform that SoftBank had envisioned.
The lesson
The takeaway for operators, investors, and policy people is that the autonomous vehicle sector consumed enormous amounts of capital before the technology was ready for mass deployment. SoftBank's willingness to write large checks accelerated development at some firms, but it could not accelerate the underlying regulatory and technical timelines. The bets that worked were the ones where SoftBank had an exit path before the hype deflated. The ones that did not were the ones where it held on too long or wagered on regulatory outcomes it could not control.
Key Facts
- Total Cruise investment: $1.35 billion paid in 2018, with a contingent $1.15 billion that was never paid
- Cruise exit: Sold stake to General Motors for $2.1 billion in May 2022
- Uber stake: Roughly 15%, acquired via tender offer at $48 billion valuation (30% discount)
- Didi write-down: $3.5 billion loss reported in 2021 after Chinese tech crackdown
- Nuro investment: $940 million Series B led by SoftBank Vision Fund in February 2019
- Nuro outcome: Laid off 30% of workforce in 2023, pivoted from delivery operations to technology licensing
- Monet Technologies: Joint venture with Toyota announced October 2018, later scaled back and absorbed
